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Texte intégral
In his celebrated 2013 volume, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty set
out a detailed empirical account of the accelerated growth in inequality within and
between societies around the globe, noting that over the past two centuries increases in
wealth have increasingly made their way into the pockets of fewer and fewer people. His
latest book returns to the question of inequality, but the focus is on what he sees as its
ideological origins rather than its empirical manifestations. Unlike the data-driven
argument set out in the earlier book, Capital and Ideology is a more discursive tour of
global history going back to the Middle Ages. There are still data, mainly used to
demonstrate the existence of inequality over the centuries, but the bulk of the book—and it
is a bulky book—is devoted to various forms of social organization and the evolution of the
ideologies that underpinned them. At the heart of this vast tome is the notion that ideas
and ideologies, especially those surrounding property, have long been used to justify and
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perpetuate inequality, and that new ways of thinking will be required if we are to reinvent
our societies as truly egalitarian ones.
The general thrust seems to be that we can view the historical trajectory of societies and
the changes we observe in political and social structures to the present day as evolving
manifestations of a ‘quasi-sacred’ view of property, in many ways redolent of
Macpherson’s diagnosis of ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson, 1962). In the
beginning, Piketty argues, most societies were ‘ternary’, or tri-functional societies,
comprised of ruling/warrior class (the nobility), the Church (clerics), and the ‘third estate’
(the peasants and other workers). In this form of social organization, property was in the
hands of the powerful, the nobles and the Church, and this was justified through their
status as rulers, warriors, and men of god. The gradual rise of new ideologies related to
ownership, as well as colonialism and communism, brought about transformations in the
tri-functional structure, usually in the form of rebellions and revolutions, that resulted in
the societies of the modern world—transformations both motivated and justified by ideas
about property, who is entitled to it, and how it should be protected. All of the resulting
forms—slave societies, colonial societies, communist societies, and even modern social
democratic societies—ultimately resulted, over time, in an increasing concentration of
wealth in the hands of a few.
2
The approach is a self-conscious inversion of Marx, with ideology now the main driver
of historical change, while the politics and material conditions on the ground play the role
of superstructure, resulting from and in service to a deeply-rooted and widespread
propertarian belief system. (7) That said, it is not easy to pin down the precise role of ideas
in Piketty’s story. He insists in the opening pages that ‘the realm of ideas, the political-
ideological sphere, is truly autonomous’ rather than mere superstructure. (7) The certainty
with which this is asserted is undermined, however, in subsequent pages, when he refers
to ‘the deep structure of inequality’ on the one hand and ‘how it was justified’ on the other
(15) and calls ‘propertarian ideology’ a ‘sophisticated discourse’ (125), thus also treating it
as superstructure. In fact, justification is the term he uses most often to describe the
ideological underpinnings of inequality, making the argument sound more conventionally
Marxist than implied on pages 7-10. These recurring tensions are exacerbated by the
absence of any clear, testable hypothesis about the role of ideology as a causal factor in
historical social transformations or in the increasingly inegalitarian distribution of wealth
in the world. This lack of rigor is surprising, given that Piketty is a social scientist who
repeatedly emphasizes, throughout this volume, the importance of granular micro-level
data and concrete forms of evidence. Perhaps this is meant to pertain only to indicators of
inequality, and not its social and political-economic context.
3
But what I want to focus on here (returning to ideology later) is the portrayal of pre-
modern history, because it is critical to understanding this political-economic context. It is
also a key piece of Piketty’s narrative, the basis on which he rests his argument about the
rise and evolution of property as an ideology and the centrality of this ideology to
institutional reform in 1789. (The argument extends to societies outside Europe, though
the focus here will be limited to pre-modern Europe.) In setting out his taxonomy of social
organizations, Piketty repeatedly assures the reader that he is aware that societies in the
past were more complex than the taxonomy allows, but that the details would
unnecessarily complicate the larger story he wants to sketch out about elites and
propertarian belief systems (for instance, on pp. 63 and 192). It is true that to make a
general argument that holds across space and time, it is necessary to see a larger picture
and not allow oneself to be distracted by specific details. But the empirical detail should at
least inform the larger picture and be consistent with the more general story. It is
disappointing, then, to see how few of the more recent empirical findings about the ways
in which past societies functioned have made it into this account.1 Especially since many of
these findings are highly relevant to questions about institutions and inequality across
societies and over time and to the idea that modernity (specifically here the French
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Revolution) ushered in an era of propertarian values; the sacralization of proprietarian
ideology at the expense of what he refers to as its ‘emancipatory dimensions’ (120-122).2
The pre-modern world described in this book is a world of elites, where the ‘third estate’
is an undifferentiated mass, with little access to property or power. This is l’histoire
immobile. The tri-functional society was the enduring outcome of ‘functional
complementarity’ and ‘balances of power’ (199 and throughout). This is a very old-
fashioned view of history, with its focus on structural forms of inequality that are
immediately apparent to the modern observer. But does such a superficial view of the past
really help us to understand the development of inequality over time? In recent decades,
new research in economic and social history, much of it in the spirit of ‘history from
below’, has shown us that peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, traders, laborers, and others,
going as far back as we have written sources, were a highly stratified population.3 Many of
these held property in various forms: buildings, land, grain, workshops, trade inventory.
They borrowed, lent, accumulated, and bequeathed their assets to their children. Even
serfs, at the bottom of the feudal ladder, had, in much of western Europe, some formal
rights to their property, including to land, which they could buy, sell, and collateralize. In
some parts of eastern Europe, most notably imperial Russia, there were serf entrepreneurs
whose wealth was considerably greater than that of the average noble landlord.
5
These detailed micro-level studies of villages and towns reveal that forms of property
and the mechanisms used to assign and enforce rights to it varied enormously from place
to place and evolved over time. This matters to studies of inequality because these
mechanisms largely determined the distribution of wealth and property within a society.
The existence of these institutions and the records they generated, in which people from
the bottom to the top of the social scale are represented, suggest a significant amount of
conflict over property well before the modern era. At a glance, we observe that serfs in
medieval England were not only able to accumulate property but, by the thirteenth
century, at least, had the legal right to defend their property and enforce contracts of
various kinds beyond the jurisdiction of their local manor (Briggs, 2008). We know now
that in central Europe, in areas of the ‘second serfdom’, east of the river Elbe, serfs had
formal rights to land and capital and could defend those rights in courts—even, in some
cases, against those of higher status (such as their overlords) (Eddy, 2013; Hagen, 2008).
Furthermore, researchers have shown that throughout pre-modern Europe powers and
privileges were assigned not only to noble seigneurs and clerics, but also to institutions
like craft guilds and towns, in varying degrees, and that this practice, too, had
distributional consequences. These organizations were capable, through local channels, of
influencing how people earned a living, what their wages were, what they could buy, when
they could marry, and even where they could settle. (Ogilvie, 1997; 2003) In imperial
Russia, the pre-modern wealth and power structure was in certain superficial ways closer
to the conventional model set out by Piketty, as there were no village or seigneurial courts
in the European sense; rather, disputes over property or contracts were resolved by
selectmen in the village commune or by the officials of noble overlords (Dennison, 2006).
Serfs officially had no legal right to hold land until well into the nineteenth century and no
appeal to civil courts until after the 1861 Emancipation Act. But even there, ordinary
people still figured out ways of securing land and other property, and we see significant
numbers of property-related cases in the archives, some detailing surprisingly modern
transactions, including the sale of grain futures and the collateralization of debt
(Dennison, 2011). In short, the societies Piketty classifies as ‘tri-functional’ varied
significantly in their political, economic, and social structures, and had institutional
mechanisms—in some places quite sophisticated mechanisms—for assigning rights to
property and resolving conflicts over these rights. And these conflicts over the distribution
of surpluses reflect a dynamism that is obscured by the ‘tri-functional’ label.
6
Okay, so pre-modern societies were in fact more heterogeneous and less stagnant than
implied by Piketty’s scheme. Does this affect the larger argument about ideology and the
‘sacralization’ of propertarian notions over time? A closer look at the discussion of
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revolutionary France and the ‘great demarcation’ in Chapters three and four leaves one
unpersuaded; there is ample space for an alternative account of institutional change, to
which the picture outlined above is relevant. The general thrust of this section of the book
is that the property rights regime established in 1789 was in many ways arbitrarily
designed and motivated by an ideological commitment to private property rights
(especially the preservation of the elite’s existing rights), and that this emphasis on
property and its contractual nature had the effect of further ‘sacralizing’ this institution in
ways that would further undermine egalitarianism. Piketty pays particular attention to the
new regime’s decision to formally separate the rights to property, assigning those to
private individuals, and the enforcement of those rights, which became, after the
Revolution, the sole purview of the state. This ‘demarcation’ not only created, in Piketty’s
view, a significant disruption to the long existing social order, and especially ‘the lower
levels of the judicial system’ (101-102). It ‘fixed in people’s minds’ that the state should
retain a judicial monopoly (101) and, moreover, it contributed to the enshrinement of a
propertarian ideology to fill the void created by the destruction of the old trifunctional
system (123), in which an ‘inextricable imbrication’ of property rights and judicial
functions had prevailed (112-113).
Two important—and related—points need to be made here. First, the assertion that
property, the right to hold it, and the enforcement of those rights were not clearly
distinguishable in pre-modern societies is simply not borne out by the empirical evidence.
As I have made clear already, conflict over property was widespread right down the social
scale, and a range of mechanisms existed within and across societies for resolving
contested claims. At one end of the spectrum, there was England, where as early as the
thirteenth century we can observe ‘forum shopping’ by villeins, who were keen to pursue
justice outside their own seigneur’s courthouse, and in certain cases had the legal
possibility to do so (Briggs, 2008). By the late middle ages, there were relatively formal
mechanisms in place to resolve disputes over land, credit, labor, inheritance—and these
mechanisms increasingly involved the state (more on this below). Similar enforcement
mechanisms existed in medieval France, including princely ‘state’ courts, such as those
that have been emphasized in research on the renowned Champagne Fairs (Edwards and
Ogilvie, 2011). A number of local mechanisms was employed before the Revolution to
enforce a range of property rights for a variety of holders—those of clerics, landlords,
peasants, townspeople, and communities as a whole. This appears to have been the case
throughout Europe. Imperial Russia, at the other end of the continuum, had far fewer
formal mechanisms than found in northwest Europe, but there were certainly processes in
place, for which we have records that demonstrate a clear understanding (on the part of
unfree peasants) of who owned what, under what terms, and to whom to turn if these
rights were violated (Dennison, 2011). Thus the ‘demarcation’ described by Piketty is not
likely to have resulted in any kind of conceptual shift in people’s minds. More to the point,
Piketty presents no concrete evidence in support of the argument that it did, while all the
evidence we have so far, for a range of pre-modern societies, indicates that these concepts
were very deeply entrenched long before 1789.
8
It is highly unlikely, then, that the institutional change described in these chapters—in
particular, assigning responsibility for property rights enforcement to the state—marked a
significant break with the past in the way Piketty posits. The attempts of the new regime to
assign and ‘contractualise’ property rights is reminiscent of the process that occurred in
England in the late medieval period, when the crown increasingly began to undermine the
judicial monopolies of the nobility, allowing all subjects to bring their cases to the Kings
Courts. Serfs and other kinds of long-term tenants could even sue their noble landlords in
state courts for violation of custom, the (often unwritten) agreement that governed
seigneurial relationships. These cases hastened the production of written tenurial
contracts and the gradual emergence of the common law (Bonfield, 1999; Brand, 1992;
Hyams, 1980).4 The extension of the Kings Courts and the crown’s jurisdictional space
deprived nobles, over time, of a traditional source of power and offered commoners the
9
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possibility of extra-local hearings and legal recourse against more powerful members of
society who attempted to expropriate them. A version of this process occurred in central
Europe after the Thirty Years’ War, when sovereign princes, such as the Hohenzollerns,
reiterated their subjects’ right to seek justice in the princely courts, over the protests of
noble lords, who sought monopolies over justice at the local level as well as the powers of
expropriation that came with such privileges. In the Holy Roman Empire, subjects had the
right to appeal beyond the local prince to the imperial courts (Hagen, 1986; Schulze,
1980). One must take care not to overstate the extent to which peasants availed
themselves of these options (there are still few empirical investigations using these kinds
of records), but we know that some certainly did (Crook, 2000; Dyer, 1996; Hagen, 1986).
The counterexample is Russia, where no such formal mechanisms existed, and the threat
of expropriation perennially loomed over investment decisions of peasants and landlords
alike. And where quasi-formal forms of extra-local enforcement were offered, serfs were
very keen to take advantage of them even if it meant paying a non-trivial fee. These cases
suggest that the formalization of property rights and the extension of state mechanisms for
enforcement may well have been as welcome a change for French citizens as they were for
others.5 More significant, however, is the scope that such mechanisms could allow for
protection against predatory practices of powerful elites against whom there had
previously been little recourse and the implications of that for the distribution of wealth
and what Piketty calls the ‘emancipatory’ effect of private property (and which, I hasten to
add, he acknowledges, here and there, as not unimportant, particularly, he argues, when
‘properly’ constrained and harnessed to nobler causes (122-123)).
Piketty’s ideological argument hinges on his historical taxonomy, which views elites as
the only significant actors in society. In order to justify and protect their rights to the
property they possessed, the wealthy and powerful, in this story, promoted an ideological
framework that conferred legitimacy on their claims to property (and rents from it) and
whole societies eventually bought into that ideology, creating the modern ‘ownership’ era.
(If this part sounds like a conventionally Marxist account of history, that’s because it is.6)
But it wasn’t only elites who were concerned about their rights to property. As the previous
paragraphs make clear, many people in pre-modern societies, up and down the social
scale, held property in a variety of forms (going back as far as we can document), and they
had a strong interest in protecting it. While it is tempting to argue that the stakes were
higher for large landholders since their wealth was much greater, one could easily make
the opposite case: The stakes were much higher for the poorer person whose small holding
comprised a disproportionately large share of his/her wealth and who might be deprived
of recourse in case of seizure. (It is, for instance, remarkable how much poorer peasants in
Russia were willing to pay to formalize the contracts they made, which often involved
property and goods of low to middling value (Dennison, 2011).) Furthermore, it must be
noted that the same ‘history from below’ has revealed that ideologies and attitudes toward
wealth and property could be as diverse as societies themselves, with significant variation
within and across them. 7
10
There are explanations for the development of increasingly secure property rights that
do not rely on notions of ideology. Conflict among privileged elites appears to have been a
critical factor. For instance, the English crown aimed to undermine nobles’ power by
expanding the reach of the crown courts. Similarly, extending appellate rights to all
subjects was a way for the Habsburg emperors to keep the sovereign princes of the Holy
Roman Empire in check. These power plays had the (unintended) effect of making
property institutions more inclusive and distribution relatively more egalitarian. This is
not to claim that ideology was irrelevant, or that it played no role in the unequal outcomes
we have observed over time. But we are still a long way from a full understanding of the
political economy of pre-modern societies, and from being able to identify the concrete
mechanisms that generated inequality in specific contexts. We need a fuller picture of the
institutional framework that gave rise to specific material conditions in order to say how
this equilibrium could have been maintained for so long, and how it might have evolved
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over time to the greater advantage of the already well-off. Engaging in speculation about
the ideological motivations of people in the past—particularly those who leave behind only
evidence of their behavior and not their thoughts—is putting the cart way before the horse.
There is much more empirical mileage remaining in concrete, micro-level studies of past
societies.
Focusing on the political-economic origins of inequality rather than vaguely specified
ideological ones more easily allows for systematic comparison across societies and over
time.8 Piketty wants to tell a global story, but forcing a disparate range of societies into the
same ideological box ends up complicating the narrative rather than simplifying it.
Questions about institutions and the distribution of wealth and power in societies, on the
other hand, are applicable to all societies in any time period. They are relevant to modern
developing economies as well as those in Europe before the industrial revolution. They are
also critical to our understanding of empire. Piketty hints at this in his sections on the
French empire and the British empire in India, noting the conflicts generated by the
imposition of political and economic institutions from above on societies where these did
not fit with the existing social structure. An empirical understanding of the ways in which
these concrete kinds of structural problems influenced the outcomes we have observed is
vitally important for all the questions Piketty’s research raises. None of this is to say that
ideology has no relevance to questions about inequality. It is to say that it is difficult to
identify and explain ideologies and their various permutations over time without
understanding the specific social configurations that gave rise to them. One need not view
ideology as mere superstructure to also regard it as very far from autonomous.
12
Nor am I claiming, by placing emphasis on continuities over time, that human society
could never look drastically different at some point in the distant future. Might our
societies be based someday on an entirely different view of property and property
relations? Something more akin to the world imagined by Ursula Le Guin in The
Dispossessed, where I produce a text with the computer that I use, on the desk that I use,
in the house that I use, in a society where possessive pronouns no longer exist? Perhaps.
But the devastating failure of the Soviet ‘experiment’ has made it clear that there is no
direct path to Le Guin’s world from the one we inhabit now. The attempts of Soviet
authorities to change the way their citizens thought was no more successful than the tsars’
attempts to create a prosperous agrarian sector without the institutional framework to
support it (in particular, those mechanisms described above for assigning and protecting
rights to property). Most Soviet citizens rejected Bolshevik ideology because it was
completely at odds with what they knew to be the reality on the ground, and at odds with
how they perceived their own interests given those realities. This is problematic for the
case Piketty wants to make (the case for the primacy of ideology as well as for the idea that
‘infinite’ paths are open to societies at historical turning points), and it is clear in Chapter
twelve that he is not quite sure what to do with the Soviet case. It requires even more of
what he calls ‘twists and turns’ to make it fit the larger narrative.
13
This may seem like a churlish response to an author’s attempt to think in broad terms
and propose alternative ways of looking at the complex problem of inequality. But my
skepticism is due precisely to my strong agreement with Piketty about the importance of
the questions he raises. Rising inequality, unequal access to education, the primacy of the
nation state and its role in the global distribution of wealth, and the potential threats to
democracy of all these trends are urgent issues of our time. I agree that it is necessary to
take a longer view of these problems and that history can better inform our diagnoses of
present ills. It is therefore of critical importance that we get the history right and that our
prescribed policies are informed by concrete empirical findings. In order to forge a path to
a new society, we need to understand the existing lay of the land. We must work harder to
identify the specific mechanisms that have worked to perpetuate inequality and figure out
how to change those; in other words, we must apply the same rigor to uncovering the
origins of inequality as we have applied to demonstrating its existence. Otherwise, we will
find ourselves admitting that, in the deathless words of Viktor Chernomyrdyn after
14
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1 Specific references appear later in this essay.
2 Piketty’s distinction between the sacralization of property and its ‘emancipatory dimensions’,
outlined on these pages, is left vague; the boundary at which the latter becomes the former is never
specified.
3 ‘History from below’ is most often associated with E. P. Thompson, whose work inspired a new
focus on the lives of the laboring poor. Local, micro-level studies, often associated with the
Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, have generated new
perspectives on social structure and ordinary lives. Many of these studies are part of the CUP series
Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy, and Society in Past Time.
4 The literature on law and the use of courts in late medieval England is extensive. See Briggs (2009)
for background and specific relevance to property.
5 That the French state was already mediating disputes between seigneurs and peasants before 1789
is clear, even if there remains disagreement among historians about the interpretation of these
interventions. See Hayhoe (2008) for a discussion of these debates.
6 ‘Ownership’ societies in this account are effectively ‘bourgeois’ societies, engendered by ‘bourgeois’
revolutions, such as that of 1789.
7 There is a vast historical literature on political and popular discourses in medieval and early
modern European societies, which is most relevant to the questions Piketty poses, but is beyond the
scope of my discussion here.
8 It also enables us to better confront the complexities of phenomena often portrayed, as in Piketty’s
narrative, simplistically. For instance, the conversion of corvée to rents and the compensation of serf
owners for freed serfs was, in a number of European societies, about politics: Recalcitrant elites had
to be cajoled into cooperating with large-scale reforms. Thus the opportunities that moments like
the French Revolution presented were not unconstrained.
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